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Abstract
I respond to Ferrero’s comments on “What are Conditional Intentions?” in three parts. In the
first, I address three arguments Ferrero gives for his account and against mine, the argument
from requirement of a formal distinction, the argument from continuity, and the argument
from the rational pressures of intention. In the second, I raise some problems for Ferrero’s
views on the basis drawing out its consequences and testing those against cases. In the third,
I consider in a more theoretical vein how reasons and intentions are related, and offer an






I want to express my appreciation for Luca Ferrero’s careful, generous, and
stimulating response to “What Are Conditional Intentions?” My thinking was
heavily influenced by his excellent article in Noûs (Ferrero 2009) and there are
many points of agreement between us despite some important differences. In re-
sponding, I will concentrate on the most fundamental issue separating us, namely,
whether certain conditions upon which our intentions depend (in the light of
which what we intend is seen as reasonable) qualify the contents of the intentions
that depend upon them, and respond to some specific questions that Ferrero raises
about my account. I will not be able to address every issue that Ferrero raises, or
even to deal fully with the ones I address, in the space available. But I hope to get
some more considerations on the table in favor of my view.
For brevity, in the following I will call conditions open if (from the agent’s
point of view) they are (i) unsettled, (ii) relevant to action, in that they give suf-
ficient reasons for action or remove obstacles to action for which otherwise the
agent has sufficient reason, (iii) ascertainable in time for action, and (iv) conditions
over which, if the agent can exercise control, he has sufficient reason not to do so.
Ferrero agrees that the issue that separates us is not the question whether a condi-
tion being open for an agent makes an important difference to how he plans and
acts. If a condition is open, an agent will not act without ascertaining whether it
obtains (or not), and is committed to investigating or being alert to whether or not
it obtains and to acting then if he finds it does. What separates us is rather whether
this marks the borderline between conditional intentions and unconditional in-
tentions (my view), or whether it marks a borderline internal to the category of
conditional intentions, and the related question whether the conditions that, in
my way of thinking, provide reasons for (or remove obstacles to) action are to be
thought of as qualifying the content of intentions we form nominally directed at
those actions (Ferrero’s view).
On the latter point in particular, I maintain, in contrast to Ferrero, that these
conditions are not to be read into an intention’s content. I think that when I form
the intention to order apple pie for dessert, I form an intention whose content is [to
order apple pie], though I form the intention only relative to assumptions about
the conditions under which I do so (e.g., that a fire does not break out before
the waiter arrives). Ferrero holds that this underspecifies the content: I intend
[to order apple pie in a world in which a fire does not break out before the waiter
arrives, etc.]. For Ferrero, this makes it a conditional intention, one whose content
is qualified by conditions that bear on its rational formation. On the other side
of the line for Ferrero are categorical intentions, intentions to do something no






The difference between our views is not just a matter of where to draw the line
between conditional and unconditional intentions in a set of items conceived the
same way. Ferrero could subdivide his category of conditional intentions to sep-
arate out those with open antecedents, and call them open conditional intentions.
If we agreed on the items being subdivided and the criterion for division, our dis-
agreement would be merely verbal. But the disagreement goes deeper than this.
For we disagree on the kinds of commitments that fall on either side of the line,
as well as on the relation of the conditions to the intention. The differences are
summarized in Figure 1.
commitments to A relative to conditions, 
C, that are unsettled but ascertainable in 
time for action without undue costs, 
which require the agent to ascertain or 
be alert for whether C obtains and to A 
on the condition C by way of an 
unconditional intention to A 
=
conditional intentions to A if C 
commitments directed toward A-ing
sustained relative to conditions, C, in the 
light of which it is reasonable (from the 
agent’s point of view) to do what they 
aim at and which qualify their content, 
that is, whose contents are to A-in-C
= 
conditional intentions to A-in-C*
commitments to A, formed and
sustained relative to conditions, C, in the 
light of which it is reasonable (from the 
agent’s point of view) to do what they 
aim at, but whose contents, to A,  are not 
qualied by C
=
unconditional intentions to A
commitments to A no matter what
= unconditional intentions to A
commitments to A no matter what
conditional intentions to A-in-C 
whose conditions, C, are unsettled







* Letting ‘C’ stand also, where appropriate, for a phrase or sentence expressing the condition C.
Figure 1.
The left column (F) represents Ferrero’s view, the right column (L) mine. A
dashed line represents a division in items of the same type. A solid line (no ar-
rows) represents a division in types. Thus, Ferrero treats what I call conditional
intentions (LC) and what I call non-categorical unconditional intentions (LB) as
the same type (FB and FC). I treat (LB) and (LC) as different. Ferrero treats cat-
egorical intentions (FA) as different from everything in (FB and FC). I treat (LA
and LB) as one type. Furthermore, the vertical solid line dividing the columns
in row B and row C indicates that I treat the items there as different type than
Ferrero, that is, LB is different from FB, and LC is different from FC, as well as,
for me, LB being different from LC. In particular, whereas Ferrero thinks all the





which they are formed, I reject this. So the classification differs along two impor-
tant dimensions with respect to differences of type. The only thing we agree on is
the characterization of items in row A.
The most fundamental issue between us is represented by the solid vertical line
between FB and LB. I say these intentions do not have their contents qualified by
the conditions in the light of which they are formed, and Ferrero says that they
do. In the following, I respond in three stages. First, I address briefly three argu-
ments Ferrero gives for his account and against mine: (i) the argument from the
requirement of a formal distinction, (i) the argument from continuity, and (iii) the
argument from the rational pressures of intention. Second, I raise some problems
for Ferrero’s views on the basis drawing out its consequences. Third, I explain why
I think we should not take reasons for action to qualify the content of intentions
directed at them. (While Ferrero says that we can’t characterize what he calls re-
strictive conditions as “standing for reasons” (Ferrero 2009, p. 703), that is because
he thinks this doesn’t capture how they restrict the content of the intention; he
does not deny they bear on the reasonableness of action.)
2 Arguments for Ferrero’s position and against mine
(i) Ferrero suggests that we should characterize conditional intentions in for-
mal rather than substantial terms. I think the suggestion (sotto voce) is that I did
not conform to this requirement. I think I did characterize the difference in formal
terms. I assign a different logical form to attributions of unconditional and con-
ditional intentions, and different satisfaction conditions. We can use this to assess
what is required of someone by a conditional intention to leave the party if it is
76.5F in Jakarta, even when the antecedent has no bearing (for the agent) on leav-
ing the party. Could someone have such an intention, on my account? Yes. But
it would be irrational, a rogue conditional intention, like a rogue unconditional
intention to drink a can of paint, induced by a blow to the head. I am not sure
whether Ferrero meant to suggest that having such a conditional intention out of
the blue might be rational. I don’t think so. However I allow that to make a point
I could rationally form a conditional intention to leave the party if it is 76.5F in
Jakarta. However, while the antecedent is not intrinsically a reason to leave in this
case, it is a reason to leave in relation to the larger plan (to make a point) in which
it is embedded.
(ii) Ferrero argues that we recognize an important continuity between a condi-
tional intention to A if C and the intention an agent has when he ascertains that C,
on the one hand, and when C becomes unsettled for him again, and he, as I would
put it, now intends again to A if C but not unconditionally, on the other. Ferrero





one and the same intention to A-in-C throughout. He in effect issues a challenge to
me to accommodate this sense of continuity. (Though one cannot directly demand
that it be a continuity of intention without begging the question).
Here is how I meet the challenge. What is same across these transitions is the
underlying structure of practical motivation. Think of it this way. Idealizing a bit,
fix my preferences, and then consider, relative to a range of fully specified possible
worlds in which I exist, what I would all-in want to do. Now select a subset of those
worlds each of which is compatible with what I believe (or accept) but in which
there are other things relevant to what I would all-in want to do which are open
for me. I form conditional intentions on those open conditions. What remains
fixed as I learn about whether those conditions obtain or not is what I want all-in
relative to the full specification of the worlds left open relative to belief. This is
what on my account corresponds to Ferrero’s “underlying deep structure, with its
conditional dependencies” (sec. 9). However, there should be an important shift
in my practical commitments depending on whether I think that the world is one
in which C obtains, or is one in which it does not, or one in which it is open
and ascertainable in time for action. And this is something that Ferrero agrees
with. My account captures both the common structure and the differences in the
structure of the commitments in these cases. Moreover, what I think constitutes
the continuity is the same thing that Ferrero does except for the principle that the
conditions in light of which an intention is formed qualify its content.
Why do I maintain, though, that when someone intends to A if C and rec-
ognizes that C, he forms an unconditional intention which is distinct from his
conditional intention? And why did I say that this is analogous to the transition
from a prior intention to an intention-in-action?
The reason for saying that the conditional intention generates a distinct uncon-
ditional intention is that both the commitments they express and their satisfaction
conditions are different. First, if I intend to A if C, I do not just take the means
to A-ing that are available to me. If I intend to run if the incumbent does not:
I do not register, I do not raise money, I do not campaign. I do try to find out
whether incumbent will run or at least I put myself in a position to learn whether
or not she will. In contrast, if I intend to run flat out, then I register, I raise money,
I campaign, and so on. My undertaking these things does not wait on anything
else. There is a corresponding difference in the satisfaction conditions. The uncon-
ditional intention is satisfied iff I do what I intend as the result of executing my
intention to do so. The conditional intention to A if C is satisfied iff either the
antecedent does not obtain or it does and I then A as a result of a corresponding
unconditional intention to A formed upon coming to believe that C.
I drew an analogy with the transition from prior intention to intention-in-





intention in action is de re about the action that one is performing. A prior inten-
tion need not be executed, and hence is not de re about any action. Thus, there
is a shift in content from prior intention to guiding intention, from doing a thing
of a certain type to doing this now. This difference shows up in the contribution
in logical form of the adverb ‘intentionally’ in a sentence like ‘I moved the bench
intentionally’. To say I moved the bench intentionally is to say (roughly) that (a)
some event f of which I am agent brought about the movement of the bench, (b)
I intended of f that it bring about a moving of the bench, and (c) my intention
was satisfied (see Ludwig 2007 and Ludwig 2016, ch. 8). Thus, the satisfaction
conditions of a prior intention include that it bring about what it aims at by way
of a corresponding intention-in-action. This is analogous to the requirement that
a conditional intention to A if C imposes that, on the condition that C, it bring it
about that one A’s through execution of a corresponding unconditional intention.
(iii) Ferrero thinks my account is not adequate to the forms of criticism avail-
able that arise from rational pressures imposed in the case of conditional intentions.
Ferrero aims to bring this out by appealing to the rational pressures on agents who
intend to A if C and then ascertain that C obtains. In this case, if the agent is
presented with the means to A, there is rational pressure, intuitively, to take those
means. Ferrero thinks my account has difficulty accommodating this because it
should be possible on my account for someone to ascertain that C, but not form
the unconditional intention to A. In that case, the agent, Ferrero says, “cannot be
directly subject to this criticism” but only indirectly by way of not having formed
the unconditional intention to A. I agree. But this isn’t the usual case. Even on
Ferrero’s account, one may intend to A-in-C and ascertain that C and then lose the
intention, or fail, when the moment for action comes, to form relevant intentions-
in-action. Then the same thing could be said, namely, that the agent cannot be
directly subject to the forms of criticism that arise from the rational pressures im-
posed by the relevant intention. And this would be the translation of the situation
as represented on my account into Ferrero’s account.
3 Problems with qualifying the content of an intention
with what justifies it
In this section, I develop nine intuitive objections to Ferrero’s account. These
aren’t decisive, but they raise some puzzles about how the account conforms with
our common sense judgments, and prepare the way for the discussion in the last
section. (i)-(v) raise puzzles about the consequences of reading restrictive condi-
tions into the contents of intentions generally, and (vi)-(ix) raise puzzles about this
when they are open conditions.





money then to do so is satisfied just in case I retire next year as a proper result of
my intention to do so. More is required for Ferrero. It must also be the case that I
then have enough money to do so, since that qualifies the content. In other words,
the intention is successful only if objectively the reasons I had for intending hold
up.
Suppose I form an intention for the reasons above, and so I retire on the first
of the year. Suppose that the United States government, on the verge of default,
has only been kept afloat by loans from the IMF and Germany, but Germany,
piqued by the discovery that the NSA has been spying on its Chancellor, decides
on New Year’s Eve not to refinance the debt they hold. In consequence my savings
bank cannot cover its obligations, and likewise for the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation. Did I retire intentionally all the same? It seems to me that it would
be astonishing for anyone to claim that in fact I did not retire intentionally. I
would not have done so, to be sure, if I had known what was happening! But
though I based my decision on faulty information, I did carry out the intention
I had. The prediction that Ferrero’s account makes, however, is that I did not
retire intentionally. For on Ferrero’s account, what is announced by ‘I retired
intentionally’ (given my reasons) is that I retired with enough money as a proper
result of my intention to do so.
(ii) Intentions may persist though we have forgotten why we have them. For
example, I may be at the grocery story buying items on my list and suddenly
wonder why I am buying strawberry gelato. The reason is that my wife and I are
having some friends who love strawberry gelato over for dinner (though we don’t
care for it ourselves). But I have forgotten about it. I shrug and put the strawberry
gelato in the cart. I don’t remember what the conditions are that make it rational,
but I assume that there are some, and so I go ahead and do what I clearly intended to
do. On Ferrero’s account, this doesn’t make sense. He has to say not that I forgot
why I intended to buy strawberry gelato, but that I forgot what my intention is.
But it seems clear that I do know what I intended, just not why. It would be very
puzzling how I could have an intention, and be acting on it, but not know what it
was that I intended.
(iii) Intentions often give rise to subsidiary intentions directed at intermedi-
ate steps. Those subsidiary intentions are reasonable only if they are thought to
contribute to the satisfaction of the intention in whose light they are formed. On
Ferrero’s account, it seems that that should be read into their content. Suppose that
I intend to kill a colleague of mine. I falsely believe him to have a peanut allergy.
With this in mind, I form the intention to put peanut dust in the egg salad sand-
wich he brings to work every day. I grind up some peanuts. I take the dust to work
in a salt shaker. I watch my colleague put his lunch bag in the refrigerator. When





replacing the sandwich where I found it. My intention to kill him misfires, but my
intention to put peanut dust in his egg salad sandwich, and my other subsidiary
intentions, seem to have been successfully carried out. But if the content of that
intention is to put peanut dust in his egg salad sandwich in conditions under which
it leads to his death by his eating it, it looks as if my subsidiary intentions were not
after all carried out successfully. This seems to be the wrong result. I successfully
carried out my intentions at every stage of the plan, but it misfires because I was
wrong about his allergies.
(iv) Fourth, a related objection: Primitive actions are those we do but not
by doing anything else. I open the door by turning the knob. I turn the knob
by grasping and rotating my hand. I do not move my hand by doing anything
else, so the movement of my hand is a primitive action. Sometimes we perform
such actions for their own sake. Most primitive actions are performed as means
to further ends. A corollary of the point in (iii) is that if the further end toward
which I aim does not come about, my intention to perform a primitive action
(so qualified) was not successfully carried out. Thus, I did not perform a primitive
action, and, in consequence, I did not do anything. This is a counterintuitive result.
(v) Suppose that I have multiple sufficient reasons to do something. For exam-
ple, I want to pay back a debt because it is the right thing to do, it maintains good
relations with my debtor, and I have a legal obligation to do so. Any of these could
figure as the antecedent in a conditional intention in ordinary speech if unsettled
for the agent: I intend to pay back the debt, if that is required to maintain good
relations with my debtor, for example. All provide sufficient reasons, and I may
decide (and so form an intention) to pay back my debt for all three. Does my in-
tention to pay back my debt change if I lose one of these reasons to do so? No. It
is the same intention, even if I lose one or two of the reasons I have for doing it. I
still intend to do the same thing. But according to Ferrero’s account, I don’t retain
the initial intention if I lose one of the reasons, because all of those are read into
the content of the intention.
(vi) There is a puzzle about how Ferrero can accommodate the difference in
function between intentions to A on the assumption that C, where that C provides
a sufficient reason, and intentions to A if C, when it is open that C. For him,
each is simply an intention to A-in-C. But in fact they behave very differently. In
the former case, one simply acts, in the latter case, one will not act unless one
ascertains that C obtains. The former is a commitment to A—the latter is clearly
not. They seem to be different forms of commitment. It is difficult to see how to
capture this in Ferrero’s account because they are given exactly the same forms—in
fact, it is exactly the same commitment (see ix below in this connection). We
need to acknowledge in the form of the intention the difference in the practical





substantive in Ferrero’s terms.
(vii) Suppose C is open for an agent who will take one of two courses of action
depending on whether C or not-C. This is a common occurrence in contingency
planning. Suppose, for example, that if C, then it is best to A, and if not-C, it is
best to B. On my view, the agent has two conditional intentions, to A if C and to
B if not-C, which are rationally cotenable because only one can issue in an uncon-
ditional intention. On Ferrero’s view, these are rather an intention to A-in-C and
an intention to B-in-not-C. But this is to have two intentions with incompatible
contents. Prima facie this violates Bratman’s Principle of Agglomerativity, which
holds that it is rational to intend to A and to intend to B only if it is rational to in-
tend to A and B. But it is not rational to intend to A-in-C and to B-in-not-C because
it clear from the content that this cannot be successfully executed. Perhaps Ferrero
can argue that when it is open that C, one can rationally have both intentions, but
the question is why, since whether C is open does not make a difference to the type
of the intention in question (this is connected with (vi)).
(viii) With respect to the scenario in (vii), suppose the agent thinks that she
has discovered that C obtains. Then she decides to A (rather than to B). But what
has she decided exactly? According to Ferrero, she already intended to A-in-C, and
so does not acquire a new intention at all. There is nothing to decide. But the
result of a decision to do something is the formation of an intention to do it. The
decision marks the formation of the commitment.
(ix) Suppose that I intend to go to the party if my crush is going to be there.
Suppose that it is in my control whether or not she goes, but that I decide not to
exercise control. In this case, I will not do anything to try to ensure that she does
go, and I am not committed to doing so. This seems to be possible. However,
on Ferrero’s account, I intend to go to the party in the condition that my crush
is going to be there. This is like intending to have apple pie à la mode (I won’t
have it any other way). If I intend to A, then I am committed to doing something
toward ensuring that I bring about A. If I intend to have apple pie à la mode, I am
committed doing something to bring it about not merely that I have apple pie, but
that I have apple pie with ice cream. Returning to the intention to go to the party
in the condition that my crush is going to be there, given that it is in my power to
bring this about, and that I am committed to it, I seem to be committed to bring it
about also that my crush is going to be at the party. But as noted, it does not follow
from my intending to go if my crush is going to be there that I am committed to





4 The relation of reasons to intentions
What is the relation of reasons to the intentions they support? Ferrero and I
agree that intentions are conditioned by our preferences and beliefs (their practical
background). We agree that where preference or belief changes in a relevant way,
there is pressure for intention to change as well. This is an important point. What
gives point to intention, and makes it intelligible to an agent, lies in its practical
background. Intention is in a certain sense subservient to its reasons. The question
is how properly to accommodate this point.
I sketch an account that aims to accommodate this point while still allowing
intentions to be detachable from their reasons. The account is not original. It is
Donald Davidson’s account of the relation between practical reasoning and inten-
tions formed on that basis. Davidson 2001 argued in “How is Weakness of the Will
Possible?” that the conclusion of a bit of practical reasoning cannot be detached
from the considerations that support it. He drew an analogy with probabilistic
reasoning, in which the conclusion we reach is not detachable from the evidence
we have for it. Suppose I judge it is unlikely to rain because the sky is red at twilight
(red sky at night, sailor’s delight). Since additional evidence (that the barometer is
low) might reverse the judgment, the judgment about the likelihood of rain can-
not be detached from its basis. The transition to unconditioned belief is made in
accordance with “the requirement of total evidence for inductive reasoning: give your
credence to the hypothesis supported by all available relevant evidence” (p. 41).
A similar point applies to practical deliberation. It may appear desirable to eat
this chocolate pudding insofar as it is sweet. But if I learn it is poisoned as well,
I will reverse my judgment. If I then learn I will be tortured in five minutes, I
may reverse my judgment again. So judgments about what it is best to do given
our beliefs and preferences are conditioned by those beliefs and preferences. They
are not detachable. When we are faced with a decision about what to do, given
time constraints and resources for investigation, we take as much into account as
we can, and ideally we make an all-things-considered judgment. That judgment too
will be conditioned by the reasons for it. It will not be an all-out or unconditional
judgment. Davidson argued that an unconditional judgment corresponds to the
commitment to act. It is the fateful step in which one detaches a conclusion (in the
form of a commitment) from the evidence. This was also an element in his argu-
ment for the possibility of weakness of will, which arises, on his view, when one’s
unconditional judgment does not align with one’s all things considered judgment,
and this was part of the argument for their being distinct. The gap is bridged by
what Davidson called the Principle of Continence (the analog of the requirement
of total evidence): “perform the action judged best on the basis of all available
relevant reasons” (Davidson 2001, p. 41), which is to say, judge unconditionally





the intention corresponds to the unconditional judgment. The intention then is
also logically detached from the reasons for it, though its rationality depends upon
them through the Principle of Continence. So the intention looks back essentially
to its reasons for its legitimacy, though neither its form nor its content make ref-
erence to them. This allows intentions to be satisfied when they are based on false
beliefs (2.i), to persist when we have forgotten the reasons for them (2.ii), for the
stages in a plan to be carried out successfully when one is mistaken about their
relation to one’s ultimate end (2.iii-iv), and for their content to remain the same
when one loses some but not all sufficient reasons for them (2.v).
In contrast, Ferrero looks for a deeper connection between an intention and
its reasons which he locates in their qualifying its content. This is tighter even
than the connection Davidson identifies between practical judgments conditioned
by their reasons and those reasons; for Davidson the form of the judgment involves
a specification of the considerations, but not in the content of what is justified. It
seems to me, however, that treating the conditions in the light of which we form
intentions as qualifying their content distorts the relation between the reasons and
what they are reasons for, in two ways.
First, the reasons are to justify what one intends. But if one reads them as
qualifying the content of the intention, then one loses the structure of the justifi-
cation. Suppose I intend to eat in order to gain strength. My justification, spelled
out, is that if I eat, I will gain strength, and gaining strength is desirable. If we
read the reason into the intention, we get: I intend to eat-in-conditions-in-which-
eating-leads to-gaining-strength. Why is that? I might say: because I want to gain
strength. But that wasn’t my justification for intending to eat. It was mediated
by eating being a means to that end. But eating per se is not a means to the end of
eating-in-conditions-in-which-eating-leads to-gaining-strength. To justifying instru-
mentally eating-in-conditions-in-which-eating-leads to-gaining-strength, I’d have to
specify some further end that this particular sort of eating leads to. So if we read
the condition that supports (relative to my preferences) the intention to eat into its
content, we lose the actual means-end structure of the reasons for the commitment.
Let me draw an analogy with belief and desire. Some beliefs and desires are
basic in the sense that they are not based on others. But some are based on others.
I believe that the sun will rise tomorrow because it has always arisen in the past.
Here we do not qualify the content of the belief with the reasons for it. Similarly
for instrumental desires which we have because satisfying them leads to the satis-
faction of other desires. For example, I want to earn a salary inter alia so that I
can afford to eat. We don’t qualify the content of the instrumental desire with the
reasons for it. This would distort the relation of the reasons for the attitude to its
content. The same thing should be said about the relation of intentions to their





of the rationale for the attitude that we distinguish its content from the reasons for
it.
Second, there is a problem in reading restrictive conditions into the content of
intentions they provide reasons for because they provide reasons for a commitment
to act. To include the conditions that provide reasons in the content is to treat them
as providing reasons for the agent to be committed to those conditions themselves
being brought about or maintained (this was the source of the difficulty in 2.vi and
2.ix). But restrictive conditions do not ipso facto provide agents with reasons to
bring those conditions themselves about. For example, suppose that I would run
for office if and only if the incumbent does not run. And suppose I think that the
incumbent will not run. I am committed to running. But while the incumbent
not running provides me with part of my reason to run, it gives me no reason to
ensure that the incumbent will not run.
In sum, I believe that Ferrero is right that we need to respect the way in which
intentions are deeply dependent on the conditions in the light of which they are
seen to be reasonable. But I think (1) we can respect this while maintaining their
autonomy in both form and content from the conditions seen as supporting them,
and (2) that trying to secure the connection by reading the conditions as restric-
tions on the act type to be performed distorts the relation of reasons to the com-
mitments they support. If this is right, the dependency of an intention on the
conditions in the light of which it is formed is not the right model for the spe-
cial category of conditional intention. I submit that the concept of a conditional
intention proper is that of a commitment to ascertaining whether a condition ob-
tains relevant to acting and to forming an unconditional intention to act on the
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